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1 Introduction 
In Chapter 9, the South African Constitution establishes six independent "state 
institutions supporting constitutional democracy". They are the Public Protector 
(or, in international jargon, ombudsman), the South African Human Rights 
Commission (HRC), the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (the CRL 
Commission), the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), the Auditor-General 
and the Electoral Commission.1
 
 The first section of Chapter 9 asserts the 
independence of these six institutions in strong terms. It states: 
(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must 
exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice. 
 
(3)  Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, 
must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the 
independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these 
institutions. 
 
                                            
* Professor of Constitutional Law and Human Rights at the University of Cape Town. I 
would like to thank Tendai Nhenga and Sara Hilliard for research support while I was 
writing this article. 
1  A seventh institution is referred to in Chapter 9, an independent broadcasting authority. 
However, unlike the other six, this institution is not established by the Constitution. 
Instead, s 192 states that it must be established by law. In fact, an independent 
broadcasting authority was established in 1993, before the interim Constitution came into 
effect (Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993). The Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 replaced or, rather, renamed 
and redesigned the authority, which is now the Independent Communications Authority of 
South Africa (ICASA). Although the Constitution says that this authority must be 
independent, the provisions of s 181, which establish the independence of the other six 
institutions, do not apply to it. Instead, the way in which its independence is protected is 
left to ordinary law.  
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(4)  No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
these institutions. 
 
 
Models for the Chapter 9 institutions were drawn from around the world. The 
first ombudsman was established in 1713 in Sweden.2 It must be the oldest 
state institution located outside government with the power to investigate 
governmental affairs on behalf of citizens.3 The idea of an auditor general is 
even older, although auditors are not always separated from government. The 
earliest antecedent of the Auditors-General or Audit Officers now common in 
Commonwealth countries may be the English Auditor of the Exchequer referred 
to in documents from 1314.4 Independent human rights institutions are newer, 
but international guidelines for their status, composition, responsibilities and 
methods of operation were adopted by the United Nations in 1993 in the "Paris 
Principles".5
 
 Both the HRC and the CGE, which could be described as a 
specialist human rights institution, are modelled on the Paris Principles.  
South Africa established both an Auditor-General and an ombudsman (now 
called the Public Protector) before 1994.6
 
 Their continued existence became 
part of the pact between the apartheid government and the African National 
Congress, which opened the way for the 1994 elections. Constitutional 
Principle XXIX in the set of 34 constitutional principles that encapsulated the 
pact and were incorporated in the Interim Constitution, read: 
The independence and impartiality of … an Auditor-General and a 
Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the 
                                            
2  See Barrie 1995 De Rebus 580 referring to Baxter L Administrative Law 279. 
3  The first ombudsman in Africa seems to have been established in Tanzania in 1966 
(Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn Comparative Constitutionalism 208-209).  
4  See UK National Audit Office http://www.nao.org.uk/about/history.htm 11 Nov. 
5  Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993 available at OHCHR 
http://www.ohchr.org/ 26 Jul. 
6  The Advocate-General Act 118 of 1979 established an Advocate-General with the power 
to investigate matters relating to financial impropriety in the public sector. In 1991 the 
name of this office was changed to Ombudsman and the title of the Act similarly 
amended. The 1991 amendments also extended the powers of the office holder under the 
Act to matters in which "the State of the public in general is being prejudiced by 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of the State" (s 4(aA) inserted by 
Advocate-General Amendment Act 104 of 1991). 
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Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public 
finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics 
in the public service. 
 
Although only two of the Chapter 9 institutions, the Auditor-General and the 
Public Protector, were made essential ingredients of the final Constitution, three 
other independent institutions with related mandates were included in the 
Interim Constitution: the HRC, the Independent Electoral Commission and the 
CGE.7
 
 In 1996, the Constitutional Assembly added yet another to the group, 
the Commission on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities. Now grouped together in Chapter 9 of 
the Constitution, they are colloquially referred to as the "Chapter 9s".  
As in the past, over the last year or so press coverage of the "Chapter 9s" has 
often been critical. One sometimes has the impression of institutions lurching 
from one crisis to another. Criticism of the Chapter 9 institutions varies of 
course. There are the essentially political allegations that their work is 
insufficiently independent. Most recently the Public Protector was at the 
receiving end of such criticism in the context of the investigation into the 
"Oilgate" affair.8 There are also concerns that members of the Commissions 
are partisan. This issue was raised in an unexpectedly direct way when it 
emerged that a number of members of the CGE were on ANC party lists for the 
2004 elections. Sometimes critics object to the manner in which the Chapter 9s 
prioritise their work or the way in which they go about it. More mundanely, there 
are allegations of ineffective management – the HRC was publicly exposed to 
such criticism very recently, but other Chapter 9s have not escaped these 
problems.9
 
   
                                            
7  Since 1993 the name of each of these institutions has been changed: The CGE was 
called the Commission on Gender Equality in the interim Constitution. It is now the 
Commission for Gender Equality. The interim Constitution's Independent Electoral 
Commission is now the Electoral Commission and the interim Constitution's Human 
Rights Commission is now the South African Human Rights Commission.  
8  Boyle Sunday Times http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/ 14 Nov; Calland Mail & Guardian 
http://www.mg.co.za/ 14 Nov; Bruce Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/ 14 Nov. 
9  On the HRC see, eg Naidu Sunday Times http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/ 14 Nov. See for 
a discussion of the CGE, Seidman 2003 Feminist Studies 541. 
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Sometimes information that the public receives about the Chapter 9s will be 
misleading. Sometimes, of course, it is right. Each of the issues that I have 
mentioned, and others that have come under the public eye, is important and 
demands attention. Allegations that institutions set up to be independent are 
partial are very serious. But I mention these issues for another reason. Many of 
them reflect a lack of understanding of the roles of the Chapter 9s on the part of 
the institutions themselves, government, Parliament and, sometimes, their 
critics and the public. 
  
In this paper I discuss the mandate of these institutions and in so doing I hope 
to contribute to the process of developing a shared understanding of their 
constitutional role and to provoke some discussion of the implications of South 
Africa's current political context on that role. Here, the electoral dominance of 
the governing African National Congress is particularly significant.10
 
  
The six institutions established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution have distinct 
roles and responsibilities. Nevertheless their grouping under Chapter 9 is not 
accidental and I think that they all share two roles: that of checking government 
(or, in the language of the Constitution, of contributing to accountable and 
government or "monitoring" government), and that of contributing to the 
transformation of South Africa into a society in which social justice prevails. 
Before explaining these shared roles, I will discuss what they have in common 
– why they are all considered "state institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy".11
                                            
10  The ANC has 294 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly.  
 Then, moving onto their mandate, I will describe the two roles 
that I think they share. Thirdly, I will comment briefly on the distinct roles of 
each of the Chapter 9s. And, finally, and even more briefly, I will look at the 
roles of their individual members.  
11  It is arguable that the Municipal Demarcation Board, established under s 155(3) of the 
Constitution, should be grouped with the Chapter 9s. However, it is not established by the 
Constitution. Other independent institutions in the Constitution like the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission, the Reserve Bank, the Public Service Commission and the 
independent body that makes recommendations concerning remuneration of public 
officials under s 219(2) of the Constitution seem distinguishable. They all contribute to 
good governance but their relationship to government is closer than that of the Chapter 
9s. 
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2 What sets the Chapter 9 institutions apart? 
Although Chapter 9 brings together six distinct institutions, they have important 
things in common which suit them for their twofold roles as institutions intended 
both to check government and to contribute to transformation. Three features 
are relevant here: 
 
• Although they are state institutions, they are outside government; they 
are not "a branch of government".  
• Like the courts, they are expected to be independent and impartial.  
• To differing degrees they are "intermediary institutions", providing a link 
between people on the one hand and the executive and Parliament on 
the other. 
 
To start with what the Chapter 9s are not: Under the traditional framework of 
separation of powers, government is divided into three "branches" within which 
all government institutions fall.12 However, the Chapter 9 institutions are not 
legislative, judicial or executive organs – they are not "a branch of government". 
And they do not exercise power in the same way as the executive, legislature 
or Parliament do. Although they all have some form of investigatory power and 
certain administrative powers, they do not "govern".13
 
  
Secondly, as we all know, the Chapter 9s are intended to be independent and 
impartial – not only outside government, but also outside partisan politics and 
free from interference by other organs of state. The Constitution asserts their 
independence in strong terms, using language virtually identical to that used to 
                                            
12  See, for a similar point, Dickson 2003 Public Law 273.  
13  See Goldstone j in President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 
(CC) at par [11] who says that there are only three branches of government. The first 
electoral commission had a power very similar to that of courts. It was required to assess 
the election process and declare whether or not the elections were free and fair (s 18 
Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993). This power has been removed. 
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declare the independence of the courts.14 But independence and impartiality 
cannot be created by declarations.15 To secure their independence, the 
selection of people to office under Chapter 9, with the exception of the 
commissioners on the CRL Commission, must be by a special majority in the 
National Assembly and their dismissal likewise requires a special parliamentary 
majority.16
 
 This is a common device for ensuring that public officials command 
broad political support and are not merely the cronies of the governing party. 
This in turn means that their work is credible to all parties and is not seen as 
partisan.  
By locating Chapter 9s outside government and attempting to secure their 
independence, the Constitution also presumably intends to depoliticise the 
issues with which they deal. This is clearly the reason for entrusting the task of 
running elections to a Chapter 9 institution.  
 
Thirdly, the Chapter 9s are what might be called "intermediary institutions", 
providing a different opportunity for public participation in public life to that 
provided in political processes. Located between citizens and the government, 
they provide a way in which the needs of citizens can be articulated outside the 
loaded environment of party politics. If the Chapter 9s are truly independent 
they can provide a reliable voice for people, unburdened by the political 
                                            
14  Unlike the courts, Chapter 9s are expected to account to Parliament (s 181(5)). However, 
in requiring them to account to Parliament, the Constitution could not permit their 
independence to be undermined and so their accountability and their relationship to 
Parliament must be different from that of a Minister. 
15  Establishing the proper relationship between the executive and the Chapter 9s has proved 
to be difficult. See, e.g., NP of SA v Government of the RSA 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) par 
[89]ff.  
16  S 193 and 194 of the Constitution deal with the appointment and removal of officers of the 
Chapter 9 institutions. Stricter provisions apply to the Public Protector and the Auditor-
General. Their appointment requires the support of 60 percent of the National Assembly 
and their removal requires a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The 
appointment and removal of members of the HRC, the CGE and the Electoral 
Commission requires the support of a majority of the members of the National Assembly. 
This is a slightly greater number than is required for the passage of legislation. S 11 of the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002 sets out an elaborate appointment procedure for 
the members of the CRL Commission but Parliament is not involved. The dismissal of 
members of the CRL Commission is covered by the same constitutional provision that 
provides for the dismissal of members of other Chapter 9 commissions. 
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exigencies of the day or vested interests. This potential link to the people is 
what makes the Chapter 9s uniquely able to fulfil the dual roles of checking 
government and contributing to the programme of transformation to which the 
Constitution commits us.17
 
 
We are becoming familiar with this intermediary role through the work of the 
HRC. Its recent public hearings on education provide a good example. 
Prompted by the large number of complaints that the Commission has received 
about the government's failure to fulfil its obligation to provide a right to basic 
education, the hearings provided an opportunity for citizens and the 
government to raise concerns about education.18
 
 Because hearings like this are 
generally not adversarial and because the reports drafted by the Commission 
after previous hearings have credibility, the hearings provide an effective way of 
assessing problems and drawing government's attention to them. 
But it is not only the three human rights institutions, the HRC, the CGE and the 
CRL Commission, that might be expected to fulfil this intermediary role. Barrie 
describes the role of the Public Protector thus:  
 
Not only are grievances remedied, but the likelihood of their 
recurrence is lessened. This, ombudsmen accomplish by acting as 
conduits of communication between citizens and the government.19
 
 
The importance of institutions which can serve as intermediaries between the 
people and government in a young democracy in which many people are 
impoverished, have limited access, if any, to services and no contact with 
politicians is captured poignantly in a conversation related by a Commissioner 
on the HRC. At the end of a public hearing organised by the HRC in a remote 
rural area, a participant thanked him profusely. Embarrassed and acutely aware 
of how little the HRC could do to address the huge need of the community, the 
                                            
17  See Kumar 2003 Am University Int'l LR 297: "[National Human Rights Institutions] should 
develop internal mechanisms that involve civil society to ensure that human rights do not 
remain an official or quasi-official discourse, but rather become a democratised debate 
involving all sections of the society." 
18  Blaine Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/ 10 Oct. 
19  Barrie 1995 De Rebus 583. 
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Commissioner said "But we have done nothing". The reply was immediate: 
"You have told us that we are not alone."20
 
  
 
3 The mandate of the Chapter 9 institutions: checking and 
transforming 
In certain senses, the Chapter 9 institutions are a mixed bag with widely 
different mandates. The jobs of the Electoral Commission, the Auditor-General 
and the CRL Commission may seem to have nothing in common. But, as noted 
above, I think that they share a common mandate: they are intended both to 
check government – by enhancing its accountability – and to contribute to the 
constitutional project of transformation. Certainly, the appropriate emphasis on 
transformation and checking government varies from institution to institution, 
but, nevertheless, to some extent both responsibilities touch each Chapter 9. In 
bearing these two responsibilities their role is entirely congruent with the overall 
constitutional commitment to limited government and transformation that is 
captured succinctly in the Preamble to the Commission:  
 
We ….adopt this Constitution …so as to …[l]ay the foundations for a 
democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law - and 
[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of 
each person. 
 
 
3.1 Checking 
The idea that government should be checked is familiar. In liberal democratic 
constitutions like ours, checks and balances on government take many forms. 
The requirement that the executive account to Parliament and Parliament's 
power to dissolve the executive are ways in which Parliament can check the 
executive and curb abuses of its power. The power of the Constitutional Court 
to declare laws unconstitutional allows the courts to check Parliament and 
                                            
20  Conversation with Dr Leon Wessels, HRC Commissioner, 3 November 2005. 
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ensure that it always acts within the constraints of the Constitution. Less 
directly, the role of the Judicial Service Commission in appointing judges 
provides a check on the judiciary by giving the executive, Parliament and the 
legal profession a say in the composition of the judiciary.  
 
The traditional "checks and balances" intended to control government and the 
use of power have developed over centuries. However, they have not always 
been effective. In particular, in parliamentary systems the relationship between 
the executive and legislature often leaves the majority in Parliament disinclined 
to exert control over the executive. Instead, it interprets its role as supporting 
the government. This problem is exacerbated in systems like that in South 
Africa in which one party dominates and under an electoral system in which 
accountability to citizens is easily perceived as less important than 
accountability to party structures.  
 
Institutions like the Chapter 9s are intended to supplement the traditional 
methods of securing accountable government. Thus, in 1997, the Constitutional 
Court described them, together with the Bill of Rights, as "enhanc[ing]" the 
"protective framework for civil society" which is provided by multi-party 
democratic government and multi-sphere government.21
                                            
21  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re-Certification of the Amended 
Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 2 SA 97 (CC) par [25]. 
The court makes this comment in the context of a discussion of the protection of cultural 
rights, but it applies more generally too. 
 But the checking role 
of the Chapter 9s is different from that that one branch of government exercises 
over another in a system of separation of powers with checks and balances. As 
already noted, the Chapter 9 institutions are not a branch of government. They 
do not have governmental power. Unlike the courts, they cannot conclusively 
declare government action to be unconstitutional or illegal. Unlike Parliament 
they cannot require the executive to resign. Unlike the executive, they cannot 
control the legal system by choosing our top judges or control the 
implementation of policy by managing the budget. They cannot order the 
executive to act in a certain way and they cannot penalise unconstitutional 
behaviour. Indeed, in conferring a checking role on the HRC, the CGE and the 
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CRL Commission, the Constitution uses less direct language too – it gives them 
the power to "monitor" government (and other institutions). In short, the check 
that the Chapter 9s provide on the exercise of government power is not through 
the exercise of power. Instead, they check government power by providing a 
legitimate and authoritative account of government's record, which can be used 
by citizens and Parliament in scrutinising government's performance.  
 
This manner of securing accountable government has been described in 
various ways. An increasingly familiar distinction in discussions of 
accountability is that between enforceability and answerability. Reif puts it this 
way:  
 
Answerability is … the power given to an institution to ask 
"accountable actors" to give information on their decisions and to 
explain the facts and the reasons upon which these decisions are 
based, whereas the enforcement element of accountability is 
composed of punishment or other negative sanctions for 
inappropriate behaviour.22
 
  
 
Under this distinction, a Chapter 9 institution such as the Auditor-General or the 
HRC does not have the power to enforce accountability, but can demand an 
account of what the state and other actors have done. In other words, these 
bodies are answerable to the Chapter 9s. 
 
Another way of understanding the accountability function of the Chapter 9s is to 
look at the mechanisms that they can use to control – or check - government. 
Again Reif is helpful. Drawing on Hertogh and Oosting, she distinguishes 
enforcement and compliance and says:  
 
If the focus is on compliance, it is possible to look not only at the 
effectiveness of mechanisms to obtain enforcement of the law (the 
"sticks" approach), but also at approaches or incentives that 
                                            
22  Reif 2000 Harv Human Rights J 28 drawing on Schedler Conceptualizing Accountability 
14-17. 
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engender voluntary conformity with the law (the "carrots" 
approach).23
 
 
 
She would then characterise the control that our Chapter 9s can apply to 
government as "'cooperative control' as opposed to the 'coercive control' of the 
courts".24
 
 She describes this distinction further:  
Cooperative control is facilitative and proactive, using advice and 
persuasion, wherein the actors confer and dialogue to try to obtain 
the desired result and change behaviour. In contrast, coercive 
control is reactive, and control is imposed by unilateral decision.  
 
 
Understanding the role of the Chapter 9s as requiring answers (or explanations 
or accounts) from government (and other actors) and as more cooperative than 
coercive, seems to be a helpful way of understanding their role as a check on 
government. The Auditor-General provides a good example of this form of 
checking government. When the Auditor-General audits government's annual 
financial statements he (or she) provides a professional appraisal of 
government's spending against the budget agreed to by Parliament at the 
beginning of the financial year. In so doing he provides Parliament and the 
public with an independent account of the government's behaviour. However, 
the Auditor-General has no power to act on findings of financial 
mismanagement or unauthorised spending. That power is vested in Parliament. 
The Auditor-General's authority lies in his power to get information and the 
credibility of his reports. The credibility of the reports in turn lies both in the 
quality and professionalism of the work of the Auditor-General's office and in 
the legitimacy of the office as an independent constitutional institution. 
Ultimately, the force of the Auditor-General as an institution that contributes to 
accountable government lies in influence, not in formal power.  
 
                                            
23  Reif 2000 Harv Human Rights J 30 referring to Hertogh and Oosting 1996 Eur YB Comp 
Gov't & Pub Admin and Hertogh 1998 Int'l Ombudsman YB 69. 
24  Reif 2000 Harv Human Rights J 31 referring to Hertogh 1998 Int'l Ombudsman YB 69. 
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As an intermediary institution that brings people outside the state sector into 
accountability processes, the Auditor-General is weak. He (or she) provides 
information which the public can use to hold the government to account, but he 
does not actively engage the public. However, as an institution that enforces 
accountability by making government answerable, the Auditor-General is the 
most powerful of the Chapter 9s. This is partly due to the professional (and 
objective) nature of the work of the Auditor-General and perhaps partly to the 
fact that the institution is well-established both here and in other democracies.  
 
The role of the Chapter 9s as institutions making government answerable and 
exerting "cooperative" control is also evident when one looks at the work of the 
CGE or the HRC. They are intended to investigate the implementation of rights 
and engage with government and, particularly, Parliament. Like the Auditor-
General, they can demand that the government provides an account of its 
actions. The Human Rights Commission's reports on social and economic 
rights are a good example of the way in which the Chapter 9s can contribute to 
accountable government through influence rather than enforcement. In 
compiling these reports it has an opportunity to verify information from 
government by drawing on information from the public. In this way it both draws 
the public into accountability processes and provides Parliament and the public 
with a credible assessment of government performance.  
  
Of course, the effectiveness of these "soft" accountability mechanisms is not 
guaranteed by constitutional declarations of their independence and 
impartiality, special appointment processes or security of tenure. This is 
especially the case in a situation of one-party dominance where super 
majorities for appointment and dismissal are rendered ineffective in securing 
inter-party support because the governing party can choose the incumbents of 
the Chapter 9 institutions.25
                                            
25  See, for instance, Anon Sunday Times 
 In such circumstances, the challenge the 
http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/ 14 Nov: "Not 
surprisingly, my media colleagues staged a synchronised volcanic eruption calling 
Mushwana's findings, among other things, a whitewash. The real question, though, is 
whether we should be in the least bit surprised that an office set up by government to 
investigate the affairs of government should fall so short of expectations."  
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individuals in office under Chapter 9 face to establish their credibility and to fulfil 
their responsibilities effectively, is formidable. 
 
 
3.2 Transformation  
The second shared constitutional mandate of the Chapter 9s is to contribute to 
the project of transformation that the Constitution embraces. Its commitment to 
transformation sets the South African Constitution apart from many, if not most, 
other constitutions.26 It is not a static document, simply setting up institutions to 
govern and describing the allocation of power. Instead, it commits South Africa 
to a massive programme of transformation. This is reflected in the Preamble, 
but made much more concrete in other provisions of the Constitution, 
particularly the provisions in the Bill of Rights, obliging the state to implement 
social and economic rights.27
 
 It is carried through to the mandates of the 
Chapter 9 institutions. Thus, s 184(1) says that the HRC must –  
…promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights; 
[and] promote the protection, development and attainment of human 
rights.28
 
  
The Commission for Gender Equality has a similarly forward-looking role. It 
must – 
 
…promote respect for gender equality and the protection, 
development and attainment of gender equality.29
 
  
The mandate of the CRL Commission picks up another aspect of South Africa's 
transformation. It must –   
 
…promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities.30
                                            
26  For an excellent discussion of the South African Constitution as a transformative 
document see Klare 1998 SAJHR 146. 
 
27  See s 8 and 26 - 9. 
28  S 184(1)(a) and (b). 
29  S 187(1). 
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All three institutions are also mandated to educate and the constitutional briefs 
of both the CRL Commission and the CGE include lobbying.  
 
These provisions give the HRC, the CGE and the CRL Commission an explicit 
mandate of transformation and mobilisation. They are expected to build support 
around human rights norms and build up networks of citizens committed to the 
basic values of the Constitution. In so doing they will strengthen the ability of 
the new democratic order to protect the values spelt out in section 1 of the 
Constitution.  
 
The transformation mandate is perhaps weaker in the other Chapter 9s 
(although the Electoral Commission's statutory mandate includes education).31
 
 
Nevertheless, each contributes to the transformation project. Even the most 
contained of the institutions, the Auditor-General, has embraced an approach to 
its role that is more proactive and forward looking than a purely checking 
function might be. First, supplementing traditional audit reports with reporting 
on under spending the Auditor-General has alerted government (and the public) 
to central problems with the current transformation agenda. Secondly, the 
Auditor-General is exploring ways of doing "performance auditing" which goes 
beyond traditional auditing and provides an assessment of the effectiveness of 
financial management policies.   
It is possible for these two responsibilities – checking government and 
promoting transformation – to be seen as contradictory or in tension with one 
another. Checking government may be seen to set the Chapter 9s in opposition 
to the government, while some believe that any contribution to the 
transformation process must necessarily be synchronised with government 
policy. But there is no necessary tension nor did our constitution-makers 
visualise a tension or contradiction. In an excellent analysis of the work of the 
CGE, Gay Seidman puts it this way:  
                                                                                                                               
30  S 187(1). 
31  S 5(1)(d) and (k) Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. 
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As in many other new democracies, South Africa's democratically 
elected constituent assembly recognized that a negotiated transition 
meant change would be slow and gradual. … Even after the 1994 
elections, new ministers had to rely heavily on the civil servants 
already in place for information and for policy implementation. In this 
context, independent horizontal bodies appeared as important 
innovations designed to offer channels through which citizens could 
appeal outside the normal structures of government, as they sought 
to define their newly granted constitutional rights in practice. … 
[Independent institutions] were … designed to give the new 
government greater flexibility, to challenge past practice, and to 
create a more democratic polity and culture.32
 
 
 
Here, checking (or monitoring) government and transformation are two sides of 
the same coin and accountable government is envisaged as the partner of 
responsive government.  
 
 
4 Individual mandates of the chapter 9 institutions  
Despite my argument that the Chapter 9s have responsibilities in common, 
each does have a distinct role to play in South Africa's constitutional order. I will 
not discuss the details of each of their specific roles here, but will simply make 
three general points. 
 
First, the different roles of the different Chapter 9s fit neatly together. From the 
Electoral Commission, whose role it is to protect events that are the very 
foundation of democracy to the CRL Commission, which is entrusted with the 
task of maintaining diversity and protecting difference in what is still a very 
fragile – and recently united – polity, the Chapter 9s cover key aspects of 
constitutional government. In particular, I think that the three human rights 
institutions, whose mandates are in most danger of overlapping, complement 
each other neatly. HRC clearly has the broadest mandate, but that is focused 
(without being limited) by the requirement to monitor social and economic 
                                            
32  Seidman 2003 Feminist Studies 545. 
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rights. The CRL Commission and CGE supplement the work of the HRC with 
their specialised focuses.33
 
  
Secondly, the individual mandates of the Chapter 9s are very broad. This, 
again, is particularly the case in relation to the three human rights institutions. 
For instance, they are not only responsible for promoting and protecting human 
rights vis a vis the state, but their mandate also extends to the private sector. 
Moreover, the Constitution and their enabling statutes provide a long list of 
functions that they can perform in fulfilling their mandates.34 These lists are a 
clear indication of the discretion that the Commissions have in determining 
what they will do – the intention seems to be to ensure that they have real 
flexibility in fulfilling their mandates.35
 
  
The third point concerns the implementation of the mandates of the three 
human rights institutions. The fact that they have distinct roles and that their 
enabling legislation gives them considerable flexibility in fulfilling these roles 
should not be taken to mean that their mandates are easy to implement or 
easily interpreted. First, there are obvious issues of prioritising and much of the 
criticism of the Chapter 9s in the past has related to the way in which they have 
prioritised tasks. However, as Seidman shows in relation to the CGE, the 
interpretation of mandates raises more substantial issues than what should be 
done first. She suggests that the virtual stalemate in the CGE in 2000 was 
caused in part by deep disagreement about the approach of the Commission. 
For some Commissioners, she suggests,  
                                            
33  There is debate about the continued existence of these three separate institutions. In 
particular, questions are asked about the role of the CGE. The debate is not new. When it 
was included in the interim Constitution there were three views: (i) that gender rights (or, 
really, women's rights) were in danger of marginalisation and that a special focus was 
imperative; (ii) that a special institution for gender rights was an important transitional tool 
for ensuring that gender was 'mainstreamed' in South Africa and, more particularly, on the 
new government's agenda; and (iii) that a separate institution for gender rights would 
simply itself marginalise women's interests as other institutions would comfortably 
relinquish responsibility and leave the institution with an impossible burden. 
34  See in particular: Commission for Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996, s 11; South African 
Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994, s 7; and Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002, 
s 5. 
35  This follows the requirements of the Principles relating to the Status of National 
Institutions (The Paris Principles), see n 5 above.  
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…the Commission structure held out the promise that they could 
voice a feminist critique from within government, representing 
'women's interests' in feminist terms. However, [others] stressed the 
importance of mobilizing wider support for feminist concerns, a 
project that seemed to require a more moderate, pragmatic profile.36
 
 
 
It may be argued that a commission mandated to promote gender equality is 
especially likely to become mired in such ideological problems because its 
mandate requires it to challenge basic social patterns of gender relations, 
inequality and power. However, it is unlikely that the other two human rights 
commissions are entirely free from dealing with value-laden issues. Each of the 
institutions needs to make difficult decisions about how best to present their 
findings and engage with government. Views will differ on what demands are 
fair - and what is strategic. In addition, Commissioners will find themselves in 
disagreement on specific issues. In particular, the CRL Commission will surely 
be confronted with questions relating to the degree to which cultural groups 
should assimilate or be protected in isolation from others. Questions like these 
divide communities across the globe. The Sharia tribunals proposed for Ontario 
recently provide an example of such an issue confronted in practice.37
 
 They 
raised complicated questions concerning the appropriate line between self-
regulation and regulation by the state on which our Commissioners – like 
Canadians – would surely differ. The Commissions cannot avoid questions 
which are of immediate importance to South Africans and still retain credibility. 
Accordingly, they need to find ways of dealing with disagreement.  
 
                                            
36  At 542. 
37  For a discussion, see Duff-Brown http://www.beliefnet.com/ 8 Nov; Tynes BBC News 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 8 Nov; Carter BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 8 Nov.  
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5 The role of individual commissioners 
The offices of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General are each held by a 
single person, but the four other institutions set up by Chapter 9 consisted of a 
number of commissioners: currently six in the case of the HRC, eight for the 
CGE, 18 for CRL Commission and five for the Electoral Commission. At the 
moment, individual Commissioners have a relatively low public profile. Instead, 
what prominence the Commissions have is attached to their institutional profile 
and the commissions usually seem to speak with one voice.  
 
There is obvious value in building a strong institutional profile for new 
institutions. But, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission showed, 
commissioners with high public profiles are likely to contribute to the profile of 
the commissions themselves, not undermine it. Were commission members to 
be household names, the work of the commissions would be more visible. 
Commissions risk being faceless institutions, lost in the maze of acronyms that 
inhabit post-1994 South Africa. Building the public profile of their members can 
counter this. Moreover, a public familiar with the Chapter 9 commissioners will 
also see South Africans from diverse backgrounds united in a commitment to 
promoting good governance and human rights. This example itself would 
contribute to the fulfilment of the mandate of the Chapter 9s. 
 
The suggestion that Commissioners with strong public profiles would enhance 
the status of the Commissions and their ability to fulfil their functions is unlikely 
to be controversial. However, people are likely to differ on the question whether 
Commissioners have individual mandates or if the Commissions should act as 
single units, presenting single views on the issues on which they report.  
 
There are strong arguments for consensus reports from the Commissions. 
They settle matters and are inevitably more influential than divided positions 
would be. However, reports which reflect no dissent will not always be credible. 
As I suggest in the previous section, it is unlikely that Commissioners will 
always agree on the issues with which they deal.  
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Many commissioners feel that the public wants – and deserves – clear answers 
and that dissenting opinions cloud issues.38
 
 This is, of course, true. However, 
many of the issues with which the commissions deal are cloudy and persistent 
unanimity on matters on which reasonable people around the world disagree 
will eventually undermine the credibility of the institutions and, when reports 
support the government, give credence to complaints that they are too 
executive minded. The CRL Commission faces such a test now. It is engaging 
with the South African Law Reform Commission on the question of Muslim 
personal law and the draft bill that the Law Commission has prepared on the 
subject. The Muslim on the CRL Commission has been asked to represent the 
Commission in this process. But will his view (in support of the current version 
of the Law Commission's Bill which gives substantial powers to shari'a courts) 
be accepted by all other members of the Commission? That is unlikely. The 
Muslim community itself is divided on the draft bill. Moreover, the CRL 
Commission's approach to this bill will also signal its views on the broader issue 
of the appropriateness of special legal regimes for different communities in 
South Africa. All the members of the CRL Commission need to reflect carefully 
on this question and one would expect their divergent views to be properly 
represented. 
So, while it might be easy for Commissioners to reach agreement on many of 
the smaller issues that they confront, the more substantial issues will surely 
often engender disagreement. And, properly explained disagreements amongst 
commissioners could serve South Africa's young democracy well. First, it could 
deepen debate on the issues concerned (much as the divided report of the 
Electoral Task Team of 2003).39 Secondly, it would allow the Commissions to 
provide a role model for the kind of tolerance of divergent views that is an 
essential ingredient of a constitutional democracy.40
                                            
38  There is at least one example of a Commissioner distancing herself publicly from the 
position of a Commission. Helen Suzman, Commissioner on the HRC, made a public 
statement that she did not support the majority position of the HRC on the Equality Bill 
when it was being discussed.  
  
39  Electoral Task Team http://home-affairs.pwv.gov.za/ 11 Nov. 
40  The practice of the Constitutional Court seems to provide a good model. Like other courts 
in common-law jurisdictions, the Constitutional Court allows both dissenting opinions and 
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6 Conclusion 
The institutions established in Chapter 9 have important mandates. Their role is 
particularly significant now because constitutional democracy in South Africa 
faces a number of specific interrelated challenges: 
 
• First, it is a young and impressionable democracy and our understanding 
of constitutional democracy and the rule of law is still developing. 
Located outside government, but with constitutional legitimacy, the 
Chapter 9s have an opportunity to explain what constitutional democracy 
means41
 
 and provide examples of the value of real debate and the 
tolerance of a diversity of opinions.  
• Second, the South African government is faced with the formidable 
challenges of huge needs and expectations with limited human capacity. 
To meet the challenge, the state has broad discretionary powers. At the 
same time, administrative systems are immature and under great 
pressure. As public watchdogs, the Chapter 9s can hold government to 
account, reassuring the public when all is well and alerting it to problems 
when it is not. 
 
• Thirdly, we are a one-party dominant state. It is important to note that 
dominance is not illegitimate. Instead, it is a reflection of the ANC's 
success in government. Nevertheless, it brings with it the danger that the 
party comes to feel that it owns the system and pays limited attention to 
opposition or even the voters. As intermediary institutions the Chapter 9s 
offer citizens an opportunity to express their needs and concerns. The 
Chapter 9s can also demonstrate the compatibility of constructive debate 
                                                                                                                               
concurring opinions that reflect slightly different approaches. However, its record suggests 
that on certain issues of outstanding national importance such as the certification of the 
Constitution, great effort was made to reach consensus. 
41  The National Conference on Racism held by the HRC in 2000 clearly did this. See, e.g., 
Ansell 2004 Politikon 3. 
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with government with the programme of transformation and nation-
building.  
 
The challenges that constitutional democracy in South Africa faces are 
challenges for the Chapter 9 institutions too. In particular, they are still finding 
their feet and developing their understandings of their roles. Like all other South 
African institutions, they struggle with limited resources. In addition, one-party 
dominance weakens the impact of the constitutional devices related to 
appointment and tenure that are intended to protect their credibility and 
independence. The dominance of the ANC also implicitly challenges the efforts 
of the Chapter 9s to create a space for critical debate outside government. The 
democratic legitimacy of the government is still firmly underpinned by its 
liberation legitimacy. This is often taken to give it a monopoly on understanding 
the goals of transformation and makes it difficult to establish legitimate parallel 
voices.  
 
However, if the Chapter 9s are to fulfil their mandates and live up to the title 
"Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy", they must open up a space 
for participation in public life outside government. Responsive and accountable 
government and an environment of tolerance and trust are essential ingredients 
of the constitutional democracy anticipated by the Constitution. The Chapter 9s 
are expected to contribute to building all these by what they do and how they 
do it.  
 
In short, we need the Chapter 9s – but we need them to be independent, 
rigorous in overseeing government and relentless in pursuing transformation.  
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